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INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Todd Allen Parker relies
brief for the statements
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, the facts, and the summary cthe argument.

Appellant responds to thr fl'taff
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
This issue involves a question of ]aw which this Court
reviews for correctness.

See Appellant's opening brief ai i

TEXT OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text
constitutic

che following statutes, rules
t , IUIMIHM

M

i \ addendum.

Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 81(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Article I, § 7, Utah constitution
Article I, § 12, Utah constitution
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedu
Amendment VI, United States constitution
Amendment XIV, United States constitution

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court had jurisdiction over Appellant's motion
pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

In addition, due process

requires that the trial judge have jurisdiction since the fees
should have been returned incidental to dismissal of the appeal.
Due process requires that the fees be returned.

An

evidentiary hearing is required to determine the exact amount paid
by Mr. Parker.

The exclusionary rule and its purposes and the

admissibility of evidence at a civil action filed by the defendant
to recover monetary damages after his or her fourth amendment rights
are violated are irrelevant to the issue in this case.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER
APPELLANTS MOTION, AND THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION
OVER THE INSTANT APPEAL.
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief)
A.

THIS ISSUE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT.

Without providing any support for its claim, the State
argues that Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
jurisdictional and precludes Appellant from pursuing the return of
fees in this case.

The State's position is without merit and, if

accepted by this Court, would result in a due process violation.
Pursuant to Rule 81(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Rules of Civil Procedure "govern in any aspect of criminal
proceedings where there is no other applicable statute or rule,
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provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any
statutory or constitutional requirement."
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sentence remained in effect in this case after the trial judge
entered his order1 of dismissal.
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Hence, the trial judge had jurisdiction over Appellant's motior
return fees pursuant t ::: R i] c= 2 2 (€ )
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court does not agree that
Rule 22(e) controls this issue, the trial judge nevertheless had
jurisdiction over Appellant's motion.

To the extent

Rules

Civil Procedure play a role in this issue, Rule 60(b), not
Rule 59(e^
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
pertinent part:
(b) Mistakes, inadvertence; excusable
neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraudf etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve
party of his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been

1. The trial judge entered an "order", not "judgment", of
dismissal. The reason listed for the dismissal is that this Court
"ordered the State's evidence be suppressed." R. 52. Arguably,
this "order" was not a final judgment of dismissal, and after the
judge entered his order regarding the fees, the two orders should
have been incorporated into a "Judgment of Dismissal." If the order
is not considered » "judgment, Rule 59(e) is inapplicable.

discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an
adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the
summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear
in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or
it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or (7) any
other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment. The motion shall be made within
a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3),
or (4), not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend
its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for
fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action.
This rule clarifies that a trial judge has continuing
jurisdiction over a case to correct a judgment based on any of the
enumerated reasons, or for "any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment."
fees falls within this rule.

Appellant's motion for return of

Under Subsection (7), Appellant had

longer than the three-month limit of Subsections (1), (2), (3), or
(4) in which to file his motion.

The motion in the present case,

filed nineteen days after the order was filed, was timely.
In addition, even if Rule 59(e) were applicable, neither
the language of the rule nor case law suggests that the time limit
is jurisdictional, or that failure to file a motion under 59(e)

- 4

-

deprives the court of jurisdiction over the case or precludes the
court from hearing the motion.
Case law discusses the importance of filing a timely motion
for new trial.

In Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah

1982), the Supreme Court held in a civil case that when a party
files an untimely motion for new trial, "the trial court's only
alternative is to deny the motion."2

Hence, the trial court is not

deprived of jurisdiction even when a new trial motion is filed late;
instead, it is merely deprived of the opportunity to decide the case
in the moving party's favor.

In the criminal context, Rule 24, Utah

Rules of Criminal Procedure allows expansion of the time in which to
file a motion for new trial in criminal cases.
In State v. Belqard, 830 P.2d 264 (Utah 1992), the Court
held that the defendant could appeal the trial judge's denial of his
motion to arrest judgment even though such motion was filed after
sentencing and based on the defendant's claim that his trial counsel
had failed to file a motion to suppress.

The Court pointed out that

the trial court had held an evidentiary hearing, and "[i]mplicit in
granting the post-judgment evidentiary hearing was the trial court's
finding that there was cause to grant the relief."

Id. at 266.

As Appellant outlined in his opening brief, due process
requires that the court return fines and fees paid by a defendant

2. Burgers also clarified that an untimely motion for new trial
does not stay the thirty-day period for filing a Notice of Appeal.
The thirty-day limit for filing a Notice of Appeal is
jurisdictional. The appellate court does not have jurisdiction
unless the notice is timely filed; by contrast, the trial court
already had jurisdiction in this case.
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after a conviction is overturned on appeal.

Dismissing a case

without returning fines and fees, as required by due process, is
precisely the type of inadvertence or mistake covered by
Rule 60(b).

Furthermore, not allowing a criminal defendant access

to the court for return of fees as part of the criminal proceeding
would be a gross violation of due process.

Where fines and fees are

not returned to the defendant incidental to the dismissal, due
process requires that the defendant be able to pursue that return as
part of the criminal matter.
The State's claim that the case ceased to exist and that
this was "a free-floating motion" is incorrect in light of
Rule 60(a) and (b). The State recognizes that its argument might
"seem technical and unfairly arbitrary."

State's brief at 12. In

addition, it would violate due process, lead to unnecessary
expenditure of valuable court resources needed if defendants were
required to file separate actions, and result in a lack of fairness
and equity in criminal proceedings.
Return of the fines and fees is "incident to the vacating
and setting aside of the conviction."
F.2d 835, 836 (E.D. La. 1972).

United States v. Lewis, 478

Where a trial court fails to return

such fines and fees when setting aside the conviction, due process
requires that the defendant be entitled to return regardless of the
timing of his motion.
The State complains that if this Court determines that
Appellant's motion was timely, "who can then deny some other former
criminal defendant twenty days, thirty days, or several months or
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years, to advance some similar request?"

State's brief at 13.

Since the return of fines and fees after dismissal should be
automatic or incidental to that dismissal, Appellant fails to
understand the threat caused by that rare case that slips through
the cracks, with a defendant later requesting return of fines and
fees.

Despite the State's attempt to argue otherwise, there is no

"slippery slope" threat caused by the procedure utilized in this
case.

In addition, Appellant's request was not made months or years

later, but nineteen days after the trial judge entered the order.
"Stability, predictability, and finality" (State's brief at
14) along with fairness, reasonableness and due process require that
fines and fees be returned to a criminal defendant where the case is
subsequently dismissed, and that no arbitrary time limits be placed
on a defendant for petitioning a court which fails to make such
return part of the dismissal.

B. REQUIRING APPELLANT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION
VIOLATES DUE PROCESS.
The State suggests that Appellant is entitled to file a
civil action, then attempts to set forth the prospective arguments
of the State and Mr. Parker in such a civil action.

State's brief

at 14-5. The State's discussion is irrelevant to the issues before
this Court.
The State argues first that "dismissal of this appeal
should be without prejudice to Mr. Parker's right to file a civil
complaint, if he so wishes, seeking recovery of the fees he paid to
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Fremont."

State's brief at 14 (emphasis added).

As previously

outlined, due process requires the return of such fees as incidental
to the dismissal.

Neither due process nor the Rules of Criminal or

Civil Procedure require filing a separate action.

Fundamental

fairness requires that a defendant not be required to file a
separate action.
After arguing that Mr. Parker could file a civil action for
return of fees paid to Fremont, the State then jumps the track and
discusses a separate civil action, in which the State claims "Parker
will presumably complain that he was monetarily damaged by his
unconstitutional treatment at the hands of the officers who arrested
him."

State's brief at 14. This would be a distinct civil action

from an action for return of the fees. Whether officers violated
Appellant's constitutional rights so as to require payment of
monetary damages has nothing to do with the issue of whether the
fees should be returned to Appellant.
Fines and fees are returned after a case is dismissed; the
issue of "factual guilt" is irrelevant.
convicted, sentence cannot stand.

Where a defendant is not

Whether or not "factual guilt"

would be admissible in the State's fictional civil lawsuit is
irrelevant to this Court's determination in this case.

This Court

should disregard the State's efforts to cloud the issues by arguing
that Appellant is factually guilty and therefore should not prevail.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RETURN THE FEES PAID BY APPELLANT.
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief)
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The exclusionary rule and its purposes are also irrelevant
to the issue before this Court-

The State acknowledges that "Parker

has a strong argument for a refund of the fines that he paid"
(State's brief at 16) but claims that the deterrence purpose of the
exclusionary rule would not be served by returning the fees paid to
Fremont.

State's brief at 17-18.
First, these arguments are inconsistent.

If the deterrence

rationale of the exclusionary rule were the controlling concern,
there is no reason to distinguish between the fines and fees; the
State's argument should include both.
But, more importantly, the exclusionary rule has nothing to
do with the issue before the Court.
The State fails to cite any authority for its claim that
the fees should not be returned because the purposes of the
exclusionary rule would not be served.

Instead, the State cites a

case that holds that evidence that was suppressed in a criminal case
pursuant to the exclusionary rule was admissible in the defendant's
subsequent civil action for false arrest.
Seattle, 828 P.2d 81 (Wash. App. 1992).

See McDaniel v. City of

The issue addressed in

McDaniel is distinct from the issue in the instant case, and the
McDaniel holding is irrelevant to the issue before this Court.
The issue in this case is whether the fees should be
returned upon dismissal of the action.

The State claims that

Appellant benefitted from his time at Fremont and got a bargain so
is not entitled to a return of fees.

Such an argument could also be

made any time an individual pays a fine in a case which is
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subsequently dismissed.

It could be argued that an individual

benefitted from paying the fine and learned how better to conduct
himself.

But that is not the issue.

The issue is whether due

process requires the return of fines/fees paid after being ordered
to do so in a case which is subsequently dismissed.
While the State may think Mr. Parker benefitted from the
incarceration at Fremont, Mr. Parker may well perceive that
experience as an unpleasant one in which he participated only
because the judge ordered him to do so.

Despite the State's

exaggerated response, Mr. Parker is merely requesting the return of
fees paid by him as part of a sentence in a case subsequently
dismissed.
Finally, while Appellant objects to the State relying on
affidavits which are not part of the record,3 he recognizes that the
record does not establish the amount paid by him to Fremont.4
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court enter an order
requiring the return of fees paid by him to Fremont as part of the

3. Appellant moves this Court pursuant to Rules 11 and 23, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure to strike the affidavits of Vicki
Marker and Judy Sahm of the Fremont Center and the "Private
Memorandum" from Vicki Harker to Trina Mann which are contained in
Appendix II to the State's brief. These papers are not contained
in the record in this case, and this Court should not encourage the
State's improper reliance on material not in the record.
4. It is apparent in reviewing the record that the exact amount
paid by Mr. Parker to the Fremont Center is not contained therein.
Appellant recognizes the need for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of the amount paid by Mr. Parker. This Court should not rely
on the affidavits prepared by the State, which are not part of the
record, in determining amount.
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sentence and remand the case to the trial judge for an evidentiary
hearing as to the exact amount due Appellant.5

CONCUJSION
Appellant Parker respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial court's order denying the return of fees paid to a
state-run treatment program and remand the case for an evidentiary
hearing as to the exact amount to be paid.

5. Although the State does not develop any such argument in the
argument section of its brief, it suggests in its statement of facts
that a portion of the fees returned to Mr. Parker "should be
attributed to Parker's counsel." State's brief at 6. The basis of
the State's suggestion appears to be its concern that counsel for
Mr. Parker requested an extension of time in which to file the reply
brief in the underlying appeal while Mr. Parker was incarcerated at
Fremont. The State's unsupported and unconstitutional suggestion
should be rejected by this Court. First, the request for extension
of time in which to file a reply brief does not prolong the time a
case spends on appeal. Cases are at issue in this Court after
Respondent files its brief; in criminal cases, the case is
calendared based on the filing of Respondent's brief. Hence, an
extension request on a reply brief does not extend the time a case
spends on appeal; it only extends the date on which the brief must
be filed. Second, and most important, a criminal defendant has a
federal and state constitutional right to adequate representation on
appeal. Mr. Parker is represented by court-appointed counsel. As
this Court is aware, the three lawyers in the Appellate Division
handle all felony and capital homicide appeals in the Salt Lake
Legal Defender Association. In order to adequately represent
clients, the appellate attorneys require extensions of the
thirty-day period on many briefs. To the extent Mr. Parker's
lawyers needed an extension of time in order to adequately represent
him, due process, the sixth amendment, and Article I, Section 12
require that they be given extensions without later having to pay
for such extensions. The extensions in the underlying Parker cases
were not unusual in any way and were needed in order to adequately
prepare the briefs. The State also requested a thirty-day extension
of time in which to prepare its brief.
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ADDENDUM

Rule 59. N e w trials; a m e n d m e n t s of judgment.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a j u d g m e n t A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
for new trial, § 21-2-2.
Harmless error not ground for new trial.
Rule 61.

Jurors competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment. Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;

PART XI.
GENERAL PROVISIONS.
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general.
(e) Application in criminal proceedings- These rules of procedure shall
also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict
with any statutory or constitutional requirement.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE I
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process' to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
iratance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants,
statutory provisions, § 77-1-6.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to
present any information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in his absence, he
may likewise be sentenced in his absence. If a defendant fails to appear for
sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to appeal and the
time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make his return on the commitment and file it with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.
Cross-References. — Pre-sentence investigation, § 76-3-404.
Rules of evidence inapplicable to sentencing
and probation proceedings, Rule 1101, U.R.E.

Suspending imposition of sentence and placing defendant on probation, § 77-18-1.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
crime shall have ^ c 2 ^ ^ S S £ ^ K d is hra 1 1t £ w , w r e £ t h *
ascertained by law, and to be i n f a m S ^ T*"«*
^ave been previously
tUm; to be c&bartS w i t h , t h ? S « ° , * » * « • • • * to<***
of the accusahxn
process for o b S f w S n e s s e s fa h£"St
*""?
*
?
compulsory
counsel for hiTZ^
** f a V ° r ' " * to **» * • Assistance rf

AMENDMENT XIV

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized bv law
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and
biiiSmSmn^^
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be
quu&me±B^S^
United States nor any State shall assume or pay'any debt or o b S o ^ n !
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Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

^StaTffSbSuT po"ertoenfcrce'by appropriate le * i3 "* i °". «•»
History: Proposed by Congress on June 16,
1866; declared to have been ratified by threefourths of all the states on July 28, 1868.

